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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past thirty years, the intersectional turn has critically shifted how we
conceptualize and interpret patterns among analytical categories1 like race, gender,
class, and sexuality as more than identities to be adopted, rejected, or imposed.
Instead, these categories are analyzed as social constructions that, through the
diffusion of power relationships, have vastly material effects. Moreover,
intersectionality theory challenges the logic of how processes of racial, gender,

* Associate Professor, Departments of Political Science and Gender Studies, University of Southern
California. I thank my colleagues in the Empirical Critical Race Theory Working Group as well as
Nick Weller for feedback, and the UC Irvine Law Review editors for their assistance.
1. The idea of analytical categories of race, gender, sexuality and the like is deeply complicated
based on the fundamental contention that such categories are, at heart, social constructions. I use
“category” and “inegalitarian tradition” here, while acknowledging their complexity mostly in the
interest of space. At the same time, these social constructions—carried around in our minds,
enshrined in our federal, state, and local policies, and collective sociopolitical discourses—have
material effects like deportation, deaths in police custody, and environmental degradation.
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class, and sexuality disparities are produced and remedied.2 Intersectionality theory
has been characterized as the most significant intellectual contribution of gender
studies to the world.3 Surprisingly, at least part of its success has been attributed to
its vagueness.4 Nowhere is this more true than in the empirical applications of
intersectionality. When enacted empirically, intersectionality theory is usually
conceptualized as a theory that fits four standards of empirical social research:
(1) It explains a phenomenon. (2) It is grounded in a substantive literature. (3) It is
falsifiable. (4) It is methodologically agnostic.
Is this, however, the most appropriate way to empirically operationalize the
legal theory of intersectionality? This Article examines two contrasting empirical
operationalizations of intersectionality theory and suggests a series of trade-offs
between them, including preservation of theoretical integrity and current
litigational utility. To do so, I use an ongoing research project concerning samesex marriage, or marriage equality as it is termed by advocates, to illustrate distinct
empirical methodologies that are compatible with the intersectionality-as-testableexplanation and paradigm intersectionality approaches, respectively.
By now it is well-known that Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw first publicly
coined the metaphor of intersecting streets in her 1989 article, Demarginalizing the
Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-Discrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theory and Antiracist Practices.5 Her article has now sparked nearly twentyfive years of academic work, equality legislation, and human rights advocacy
around the world. Crenshaw, a long-time law professor, emerged from a critical
race theory (CRT) movement that is grounded in litigational strategies and legal
praxis. Those legal roots are clearly reflected in that 1989 article about
intersections through its emphasis on anti-discrimination doctrine.6
Empirical scholars have interpreted Crenshaw’s argument in that article to
claim that “race plus sex” discrimination was a previously unaddressed alternative
explanation for disparate workplace outcomes.7 Although this way of
operationalizing intersectionality for empirical research is critically important as a
strategy that can document discriminatory practices, experiences, or policies, it is
just one of two ways of operationalizing intersectionality, and not without its
costs. I call this approach the “intersectionality as testable explanation” approach.

2. Ange-Marie Hancock, Trayvon Martin, Intersectionality and the Politics of Disgust, 15 THEORY &
EVENT (2012), http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v015/15.3.hancock.html.
3. Leslie McCall, The Complexity of Intersectionality, 30 SIGNS: J. WOMEN & CULTURE SOC’Y
1771, 1771 (2005).
4. Kathy Davis, Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science Perspective on What Makes
a Feminist Theory Successful, 9 FEMINIST THEORY 67, 77 (2008).
5. Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique
of Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 4 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139, 139 (1989).
6. Id. at 140.
7. See, e.g., Rachel Kahn Best et al., Multiple Disadvantages: An Empirical Test of Intersectionality
Theory in EEO Litigation, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 991, 1004–07 (2011).

UCILR V3I2 Assembled v8.7 (Do Not Delete)

2013]

EMPIRICAL INTERSECTIONALITY

1/22/2014 4:12 PM

261

Although intersectionality has traveled from legal studies to other empirically
driven disciplines,8 it remains rooted in the tenets of CRT, which articulate a more
comprehensive, systemic critique of the U.S. legal system’s pervasive
reinforcement of racial hierarchies and perpetuation of injustice. While the
“intersectionality as testable explanation” approach is instrumentally valuable, the
prior assumptions required to enact it, which I discuss below, venture quite far
from the theoretical tenets of intersectionality itself.
Even as early as Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw’s second landmark article,
Mapping the Margins, intersectional analysis is represented as “an approach”9 and as
a “way of framing the various interactions” rather than simply as an assertion of
relevant identity content.10 Sociologist Patricia Hill Collins also uses the word
“analysis” in her definition of intersectionality. In the glossary of her tenth
anniversary edition of Black Feminist Thought, she refers to intersectionality as an
“analysis claiming that systems of race, social class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity,
nation, and age form mutually constructing features of social organization, which
shape Black women’s experiences and, in turn, are shaped by Black women.”11 If
we operationalize intersectionality in this way—as an approach to conducting
empirical legal analysis rather than a theory to be proven—it is no longer a
falsifiable theory. It is, as philosopher of social science Thomas Kuhn suggests, a
research paradigm that identifies relevant questions left unanswered by prior raceonly or gender-only approaches to empirical legal analysis.12 I term this way of
operationalizing intersectionality the paradigm intersectionality approach, and it
too has certain trade-offs.
A. An Abbreviated History of the Intersectional Turn
What Collins and Crenshaw thus appear to share is twofold: (1) an analytical
approach; and (2) a project to render previously invisible, unaddressed material
effects of Black women’s sociopolitical location visible and remediable. The title

8. This “traveling” of the theory across fields and its ramifications are not unilaterally accepted.
This evolution is a subject of vast debate. See Nikol G. Alexander-Floyd, Disappearing Acts: Reclaiming
Intersectionality in the Social Sciences in a Post-Black Feminist Era, 24 FEMINIST FORMATIONS 1, 3 (2012);
Davis, supra note 4, at 74–76; Ange-Marie Hancock, Intersectionality as a Normative and Empirical
Paradigm, 3 POL. & GENDER 248, 248 (2007); Ange-Marie Hancock, When Multiplication Doesn’t Equal
Quick Addition: Examining Intersectionality as a Research Paradigm, 5 PERSP. ON POL. 63, 63 (2007)
[hereinafter Hancock, Multiplication]; Julia S. Jordan-Zachary, Am I a Black Woman or a Woman Who is
Black? A Few Thoughts on the Meaning of Intersectionality, 3 POL. & GENDER 254, 255 (2007); Evelyn M.
Simien, Doing Intersectionality Research: From Conceptual Issues to Practical Examples, 3 POL. & GENDER 264,
264–65 (2007).
9. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against
Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1245 (1991).
10. Id. at 1296.
11. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 299 (2d ed. 2000) (emphasis added).
12. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 43 (3d ed. 1996).
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of Crenshaw’s 1989 article clearly identified the nature of her critique as not
simply “feminist” but “Black feminist,” thus refusing to subordinate race to gender
in the title as well as the analysis.13 More importantly for the purposes of this
Article, a Black feminist critique was taken to be a unified whole, not
disaggregable into a “Black” part and a “feminist” part.
With a similar emphasis on a “both/and” understanding of Black feminist
analysis (instead of “either/or”), Patricia Hill Collins’ landmark work, Black
Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and Power, published in 1990, closely
followed Crenshaw in terms of publication date.14 Yet, given typical time lags in
publishing, Collins and Crenshaw were likely preparing specifically Black feminist
analyses using very similar intersectional logic simultaneously—during the years
from 1988 to 1990. Thus, perhaps the best way to frame the “moment of naming”
is as a moment that occurred nearly simultaneously in legal studies and sociology.
To say this does comparatively little violence to the notion that Crenshaw said it
first in print, for certainly many other influences led to just such an outcome.
The point here is twofold. First, I suggest that intersectional metaphors
originate from normative theory. Normative theories and empirical theories vary
in their correspondence to the theoretical standards listed at the start of this
Article. Most notably, while empirical theories must meet the standard of
falsifiability, normative theories—particularly grand theories like critical theory,
from which intersectionality emerged—do not. While we can logically conclude
that, in order to empirically operationalize a normative theory, some amount of
translation is required, it is not at all clear that the only way to do so is through an
embrace of positivist falsifiability.
Second, intersections of race and gender (and at times class or sexuality)
were at the heart of the metaphor’s origin as non-disaggregrable standpoints or social
locations. The commitment to analyzing social locations of groups at the
intersections—as Crenshaw, Collins, and many others supported in the decades
leading up to Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex and Black Feminist
Thought—changes the first-order question by making the existence of such
intersectional sites of difference, agency, discrimination, and injustice a logical
prior to any empirical analysis. The differences between the intersectionality-astestable-explanation and the paradigm intersectionality approach are located in
different interpretations of these points in the intellectual history of
intersectionality.
13. Crenshaw, supra note 9, at 1241 (emphasis added). At the time of the Crenshaw article’s
publication, the University of Chicago Legal Forum was but four years old, with a format of a hosted
symposium in the fall of each year and submission of articles for publication in the following spring.
Crenshaw’s first article featuring the intersectionality metaphor, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race
and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Anti-Discrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, was
published in volume 1989, which began with a symposium in 1988.
14. PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (1990).
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As noted above, the claims that together are commonly called
“intersectionality” are traced to Crenshaw, who first coined the term in the late
1980s. However, intersectional metaphors have been multidisiciplinary from the
start. Scholars in a variety of disciplines15 and geographical locations16 drew upon
their situated experiences and recognized the limitations of extant social
movements and conventional strategic litigation to adequately address their
structural marginalization. All of these scholars are part of a larger intellectual
discourse about race, gender, class, and sexuality.
The claims that are commonly attributed to intersectionality emerge from a
larger historical narrative about race and gender that dates back to the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries in the United States17 and to the efforts in the 1960s that
culminated in the 1976 United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) in the international context.18
Some who are steeped in Black women’s studies trace the idea of simultaneously
attending to race and gender oppression to Anna Julia Cooper’s 1892 publication,
A Voice from the South.19 Fewer scholars of intersectionality are familiar with Maria
Miller Stewart’s 1830 work, Religion and the Pure Principles of Morality, a collection of
writings about the “unique” challenges facing Black women,20 or Harriet Jacobs,
author of the 1860 slave narrative, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl.21 All three of
these authors—Cooper, Stewart, and Jacobs—wrote in voices that were focused
on the political ideal of self-determination and grounded in the life experiences of
Black women. This intellectual tradition had three hallmarks that continue to be

15. See, for example, Patricia Hill Collins, Bonnie Thornton Dill, Ruth Enid Zambrana, and
Lynn Weber in sociology.
16. See, for example, post-colonial feminists like Israeli-born Nira Yuval-Davis of the
University of East London.
17. See DUCHESS HARRIS, BLACK FEMINIST POLITICS FROM KENNEDY TO CLINTON, at xi
(2009).
18. Nira Yuval-Davis, Introduction to ANGE-MARIE HANCOCK, SOLIDARITY POLITICS FOR
MILLENNIALS: A GUIDE TO ENDING THE OPPRESSION OLYMPICS, at xii (2011) (“Around the world,
those interested in a more comprehensive and transformative approach to social justice—whether
sociologists, legal scholars, feminist theorists, policy makers, or human rights advocates—have used
language and tenets of intersectionality to more effectively articulate injustice and advocate for
positive social change.”).
19. See, e.g., PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK
WOMEN ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA (HarperCollins 2009) (1984); BEVERLY GUY-SHEFTALL,
WORDS OF FIRE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN FEMINIST THOUGHT (1995). See generally
ANNA JULIA COOPER, A VOICE FROM THE SOUTH (Oxford Univ. Press 1990) (1982). Scholars like
Deborah Gray-White, who wrote about Black women in slavery, and Paula Giddings, whose famous
1984 book, When and Where I Enter, which took its name from what are by now Anna Julia Cooper’s
most famous words, were pioneers.
20. Maria Miller Stewart, Religion and the Pure Principles of Morality, the Sure Foundation on Which We
Must Build, in CLASSIC AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN’S NARRATIVES 5 (William L. Andrews ed.,
2003) (1831).
21. HARRIET A. JACOBS, INCIDENTS IN THE LIFE OF A SLAVE GIRL (Simon & Brown
2012) (1861).
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part of the Black feminist tradition: (1) Goals of empowerment and liberation;
(2) Focus upon Black women’s experiences and knowledge—what Collins later
termed “Black feminist epistemology”;22 and (3) Commitment to Black women’s
self-determination—power over their political, economic, reproductive and
artistic lives as Black women, not as disaggregable identities of Black + woman.
Thus, Crenshaw and Collins’ decidedly Black feminist interventions in the
late 1980s were, without a doubt, part of a Black female intellectual and
sociopolitical tradition that challenged rather than suborned a framing of their
sociopolitical location as disaggregable into race + sex difference or
discrimination. That tradition included activists like the Combahee River
Collective and the National Black Feminist Organization (NBFO), who articulated
a race-gender analysis that expanded to meaningfully include sexuality23 and
class.24 These interventions in the narratives and agendas of the civil rights and
second-wave women’s movements used language like “double bind” and
“multiple jeopardies” to critique the movements and explain the sociopolitical
location and challenges facing Black women in the United States.25
This language and logic expressed what was conventionally thought of as
unique to Black women. However, women-of-color feminists contending with
post-colonial gender and ethnic politics in the context of international
development were similarly struggling with the notion of whether a single category
movement could meaningfully empower them to have autonomy over their lives.
While not grounded in the U.S. Black female traditions per se, Anthias and YuvalDavis, as well as Trin T. Min-ha, were contending with similar questions of
narrative logic and agenda setting.26 For some, like Molara Ogundipe-Leslie, the
22. COLLINS, supra note 11, at 256.
23. HARRIS, supra note 17, at 6–7; see Avtar Brah & Ann Phoenix, Ain’t I a Woman? Revisiting
Intersectionality, 5 J. INT’L WOMEN’S STUD. 75, 78 (2004) (“The Combahee River Collective . . .
pointed, as early as 1977, to the futility of privileging a single dimension of experience as if it
constituted the whole of life. Instead, they spoke of being ‘actively committed to struggling against
racial, sexual, heterosexual and class oppression’ . . . .”).
24. The inclusion of class was also due to the efforts of the National Welfare Rights
Organization.
25. Frances Beale, Double Jeopardy: To Be Black and Female, in THE BLACK WOMAN: AN
ANTHOLOGY 109 (Toni Cade Bambara ed., 1970); Deborah K. King, Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple
Consciousness: The Context of a Black Feminist Ideology, 14 SIGNS: J. WOMEN & CULTURE SOC’Y 42, 42
(1988).
26. FLOYA ANTHIAS & NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, RACIALIZED BOUNDARIES: RACE, NATION,
GENDER, COLOUR AND CLASS AND THE ANTI-RACIST STRUGGLE (1992); TRINH T. MINH-HA,
WOMAN, NATIVE, OTHER: WRITING POSTCOLONIALITY AND FEMINISM (1989). In Woman, Native,
Other, Trinh interrogates the hierarchies of power in discourses like anthropology, postcolonial literary
studies, and feminist theory to examine the challenge women of color pose to dominant narratives of
gender, postcoloniality, and identity. Yuval-Davis and Anthias co-edited a series of case studies from
around the world—Britain, Australia, South Africa, Uganda, Israel, Iran, Turkey, Cyprus and Italy—
to demonstrate the point that gender constructs race and ethnicity, and both are deeply imbricated
with nationalism and the state. WOMAN-NATION-STATE (Nira Yuval-Davis & Floya Anthias eds.,
1989).
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gender analysis in “feminism” was so steeped in White Western womanhood that
a new concept, termed “stiwanism,” was deemed necessary.27 Stiwanism stemmed
from concerns akin to those that led to the emergence of Alice Walker’s
“womanism” in the U.S. context.28
This need and desire to develop new conceptual lenses to better account for
the pragmatic29 and theoretical challenges facing women of color also proceeded
in U.S. history.30 In cultural studies, bell hooks produced two books—Ain’t I a
Woman? Black Women and Feminism (1981), and Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center
(1984)—during an era steeped in standpoint theory that again sought to
adequately theorize a very specific set of Black women’s experiences.31 Although
not all of these scholars were doctrinaire standpoint theorists, responses to their
work centered upon who can speak, and who must step back, in order to bring
those on the margins of movement(s) into the center. Black feminists like hooks
and Gloria Joseph articulated a visual metaphor of a center and margins32 that
was, in fact, the central metaphorical influence for Black feminist theory, and
much multicultural feminist theory, prior to the intersectional turn sparked by
Collins and Crenshaw.
It is also just as critical to note that Collins and Crenshaw wrote as members
of multi-racial communities of female colleagues. Collins is part of a generation of
feminist sociologists that includes Bonnie Thornton Dill, Ruth Enid Zambrana,
and Lynn Weber, who was a trained psychologist who migrated to sociology. This
intellectual community began to talk about intersecting or interlocking structures
of oppression as it investigated women’s engagement with low-income
occupational sectors, as well as their family lives, throughout the 1980s. In a
similar vein, Crenshaw was joined in the legal academy by Mari Matsuda, Adrien
Katherine Wing, Margaret Montoya, and Trina Grillo, who were all thinking about
a variety of domestic and international legal domains. They paid attention to
evidentiary questions, which produced an often-overlooked call to revalue

27. MOLARA OGUNDIPE-LESLIE, RE-CREATING OURSELVES: AFRICAN WOMAN &
CRITICAL TRANSFORMATIONS 229–30 (1994).
28. ALICE WALKER, IN SEARCH OF OUR MOTHERS’ GARDEN: WOMANIST PROSE, at xi
(1983).
29. Pragmatic challenges may include the implementation of litigation or international
development strategies.
30. GIDDINGS, supra note 19; DEBORAH G. WHITE, AIN’T I A WOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN
THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (1979). Of course, there are many more scholars in this tradition than can
be explicitly named here. Often cited are pioneering anthologies like ALL OF THE WOMEN ARE
WHITE, ALL OF THE MEN ARE BLACK BUT SOME OF US ARE BRAVE (Gloria T. Hull et al. eds.,
1982), and THIS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherríe
Moraga & Gloria Anzaldúa eds., 1981).
31. BELL HOOKS, AIN’T I A WOMAN? BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM (1981); BELL HOOKS,
FEMINIST THEORY: FROM MARGIN TO CENTER (1984) [hereinafter HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY ].
32. HOOKS, FEMINIST THEORY, supra note 31, at ix–x; GLORIA I. JOSEPH & JILL LEWIS,
COMMON DIFFERENCES: CONFLICTS IN BLACK & WHITE FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES 276 (1981).
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narrative forms of testimony at trial.33 And they examined broad questions of
access to representation, services, and rights awareness.34 Both intellectual
communities seemed to fundamentally rethink the margin-center metaphor
simultaneously but separately from each other, as well as from post-colonial
feminists.35 That these intellectual communities spoke more within themselves
than across disciplinary boundaries as the ideas emerged makes it all the more
remarkable that the concerns and ideas were so similar.36
Importantly, these intellectual communities were distinct—albeit not
mutually exclusive—from equally productive intellectual communities in history,
English, political science, and others, who sought to revalue Black women as
historical actors, literary figures, and political agents.37 While this inclusion project,
as it has been named by a number of different scholars,38 continues to be an
important part of the Black feminist project, it remains conceptually distinct from
a project of rearticulating the relationships between and within analytical
categories. Even though moving from a center-margin frame to one of
intersections first occurred in specific disciplines, the shift has since traveled far
and wide throughout a variety of disciplines.
Based on this history of intersectionality, there are two key interventions
intersectionality contributes to how we understand demographic difference and
forms of discrimination grounded in such differences. First, identities and the
differences that are attributed to them are not fundamentally disaggregable. There
is something about being a woman of color that cannot be decomposed
empirically into a “race” part and a “sex” part. Second, the shift from a margincenter metaphor to one of intersections reshapes the way in which scholars
conceptualize power distributions. One’s membership on some single axis of
disadvantage (for example, being a member of racial minority group) does not
33. CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM 3 (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997).
34. Id.
35. See, e.g., Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial
Discourses, in THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM 51 (Chandra Talpade
Mohanty et al. eds., 1991); Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271 (Carey Nelson & Lawrence Grossman eds., 1988).
36. By identifying the similarities, I do not intend to lump all of these very nuanced arguments
together; however, there is enough overlap concerning questions of power, access, voice, and visibility
that I think a relevant grouping is worthwhile. To do so in a comprehensive manner is beyond the
scope of this Article.
37. See Alexander-Floyd, supra note 8, at 16 (listing a cadre of Black female political scientists
who also pursued their own inclusion projects). Producing this list relates to but is distinct from
“producing” intersectionality or conducting intersectional analyses.
38. Gudrun-Axeil Knapp further characterizes these studies, stating that:
[M]ost of the actual studies have concentrated more or less on micro-level analyses. The
predominant perspective has been looking at how different categories interact in shaping
subjective experiences, often experiences of discrimination, how they determine access to
resources and options and how they are taken up in constructions of identity.
Gudrun-Axeil Knapp, Race, Class, Gender: Reclaiming Baggage in Fast Travelling Theories, 12 EUR. J.
WOMEN’S STUD. 250, 259 (2005).
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prevent one from having privilege on another axis of disadvantage (for example,
being heterosexual). The primary question this Article examines is, “What are the
trade-offs for the two primary approaches to empirically operationalize
intersectionality?” Empirical scholars have attempted to translate the two above
normative insights into testable propositions, despite intersectionality’s existence
as a normative theory that takes these insights as logical priors to research
questions. Table 1, below, is instructive in understanding how prior research has
attempted to empiricize intersectionality.39
In my previous work, I identified three distinct ways scholarship in political
science, sociology, ethnic studies, and gender studies have conceptualized
categories of difference like race, gender, class, and sexuality across
methodological operationalizations as variables (for example, self-report race or
sex), longitudinal formations or historical processes (for example, racial
formations, gendered political development), and multilevel drivers of disparate
outcomes (for example, individual or structural heterosexism).40 Each
conceptualization strategy in Table 1—unitary, multiple, intersectional—has
important ramifications for research design and methodology that have not yet
been systematically interrogated in the intersectionality literature.

39. See also Hae Yeon Choo & Myra Marx Ferree, Practicing Intersectionality in Sociological Research:
A Critical Analysis of Inclusions, Interactions, and Institutions in the Study of Inequality, 28 SOC. THEORY 129,
145–47 (2010) (interrogating empirical treatments of intersectionality).
40. Hancock, Multiplication, supra note 8, at 67.
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Table 1: Three Empirical Approaches to Conceptualizing
Categories of Difference41
Unitary Approach

Multiple Approach

Intersectional
Approach

Number of Relevant

One

More than one

More than one

None

Predetermined

Relationships are open

Between

and conceptually

empirical questions

Categories/Processes

distinguishable

to be determined

Categories/Processes
Posited Relationship

relationships
Conceptualization

Static at individual

Static at individual

Dynamic interaction

of Each Category

or institutional level

or institutional level

between individual
and institutional factors

Case Makeup

Uniform

Uniform

of Category/Class

Diverse; members often
differ in politically
significant ways

Approach to

Lip service

Intersectionality as

Intersectionality as

Intersectionality

or dismissal

testable explanation

paradigm/research
design

B. The Standard Approach: Intersectionality as Testable Explanation
The intersectionality-as-testable-explanation approach seeks to subject the
claims regarding discrimination or lack of access asserted by normative
intersectionality theorists to a standard positivist empirical examination.42 Thus,
the approach takes a so-called objective position, which first requires that evidence
of material discrimination be documented as real. Given intersectionality’s origin
in the legal academy, it is certainly logical that one popular operationalization
would emphasize empirical demonstrations that discrimination, or discriminatory
outcomes exist. This kind of approach is perfectly consistent with what Crenshaw
and others call the “standard story” in litigation.43 The standard first-order
question, therefore, would be formulated as follows:
Unitary Quantitative Formulation: Did the litigant’s race (or some other single
category) have the strongest net effect on the dependent variable?

41.
42.
43.

Id. at 64.
For a trenchant critique of this approach, see Alexander-Floyd, supra note 8.
Crenshaw, supra note 5, at 145.
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Unitary Qualitative Formulation: What role does the litigant’s race (or some
other single category) play in the outcome of interest?
In other words, does race matter? The underlying assertion in these
formulations centers upon the “but-for” veracity of the claim. For example, would
a litigant have otherwise been hired but for his race? There have been popular
challenges made by Black and other women of color feminists to account for
gender, class, and sexuality as equally important. These challenges have been met
with early attempts that sought to incorporate the content of additional categories
but preserved the mutually exclusive logic of old identity politics. This has resulted
in the following reformulations:
Multiple Quantitative Formulation: Did the litigant’s (a) race, (b) sexuality, or (c)
race + sexuality together have the strongest net effect on the dependent variable,
all other things being equal?
Multiple Qualitative Formulation: How did the litigant’s race and/or sexuality
correspond to the outcome of interest?
My point in enumerating these formulations is to illustrate that all four
formulations can be worthy ways to interrogate substantive issues often discussed
by intersectionality theory. These substantive issues include questions of equal
employment access, commensurate representation, opportunities for remedy, or
successful institutional reform. The intersectionality-as-testable-explanation
approach has been extremely popular across disciplines.44 The primary
methodological strategy of scholars who embrace the intersectionality-as-testableexplanation approach is the inclusion of additional variables and a relevant
interaction term. Empirical scholarship in this vein usually claims to empirically
investigate or operationalize intersectionality by leaning heavily on the substantive
literature and methodological expertise of the scholar’s main research interest (for
example, race or gender), and giving a passing mention to, or superficially
mobilizing, the second category by introducing a dummy variable (1 = female, 0 =
male). This operational logic has also affected operationalizations of intersectional
claims, extending to modeling of intersections of race, gender, and class variables
as interaction terms. This strategy usually constitutes the primary or sole method
44. As a broad sample of how popular this approach is across multiple fields of study, see
LESLIE MCCALL, COMPLEX INEQUALITY: GENDER, CLASS, AND RACE IN THE NEW ECONOMY
(2001), Kathleen A. Bratton et al., Agenda Setting and African American Women in State Legislatures, 28 J.
WOMEN, POL. & POL’Y 71 (2006), Joshua Kjerulf Dubrow, How Can We Account for Intersectionality in
Quantitative Analysis of Survey Data? Empirical Illustration for Central and Eastern Europe, 17 ASK: RES.
& METHODS 85 (2008), Claudine Gay & Katherine Tate, Doubly Bound: The Impact of Gender and Race on
the Politics of Black Women, 19 POL. PSYCHOL. 169 (1998), Tanya Katerí Hernández, A Critical Race
Feminism Empirical Research Project: Sexual Harrassment and the Internal Complaints Black Box, 39 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1235 (2006), Melanie Hughes, Intersectionality, Quotas, and Minority Women’s Political
Representation Worldwide, 105 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1 (2011), Calvin Morrill et al., Legal Mobilization in
Schools: The Paradox of Race and Rights Among Youth, 44 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 651 (2010), and Evelyn M.
Simien & Rosalee A. Clawson, The Intersection of Race and Gender: An Examination of Black Feminist
Consciousness, Race Consciousness, and Policy Attitudes, 85 SOC. SCI. Q. 793 (2004).
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of capturing the force of intersectional claims made by theorists, depending on the
author. In other words, the reconceptualizations of power (from margins and
centers to intersections) is left unaddressed by this strategy.
While not explicitly conversant with empirical legal studies, this empirical
operationalization strategy represents a well-intentioned merging of standard
social science methods with intersectional claims that follow the social science
examples of large-N studies of race and large-N studies of gender. For example,
most quantitative empirical approaches to identifying causal mechanisms for
disparities of race, gender, or class have clumsily or myopically attended to race
and ethnicity this way. These approaches most often fit them as one or two
variables into pre-existing models, despite cautions against incorporating
race/ethnicity as a static categorical variable.45 Usually, the argument for such an
inclusion is couched in the assumptions of quantitative modeling, which privileges
the generalizability and broader statistical power associated with such
methodologies as particularly helpful for “scaling-up” local solutions to the state
or the federal level.
C. A Net Effects Analysis of Intersectional Support for a “Gay Marriage” Ban
In order to illustrate the intersectionality-as-testable-explanation approach, I
selected an issue where other categories of difference—both previously explored
in the intersectionality literature and not—were posited as explanations as well.
The 2008 Collaborative Multiracial Political Study (CMPS) provides an
outstanding large-N dataset from which an empirical model can be constructed.46
In contrast to the 2008 American National Election Study, which oversampled
Black and Latino voters, and was only available in Spanish and English,47 the
CMPS was available in six languages and contains robust samples of the four
largest racial/ethnic groups: Whites, Latinos, Blacks, and Asian Americans.48 The
CMPS contains 4,563 respondents who voted in the November 2008 election who
self-identified as Asian, Black, Latino, and White.49 The survey was offered in
English, Spanish, Mandarin, Cantonese, Korean, and Vietnamese, and

45. See David Chae et al., Conceptualizing Racial Disparities in Health: Advancement of a SocioPsychobiological Approach, 8 DU BOIS REV. 63, 73 (2011), and Taeku Lee, From Shared Demographic
Categories to Common Political Destinies: Immigration and the Link from Racial Identity to Group Politics, 4 DU
BOIS REV. 433, 437–39 (2007), which build upon pioneering work on racial formation by Michael
Omi and Howard Winant.
46. 2008 Collaborative Multi-Ethnic Post-Election Survey, CMPS STUDY, http://www.cmpstudy
.com (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
47. Id.
48. Id. The Asian American sample includes the six largest national origin groups: Chinese,
Asian Indian, Filipino, Korean, Vietnamese, and Japanese.
49. Id.
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respondents were offered the opportunity to interview in their language of
choice.50
Further, the CMPS collected data on a number of political issues where race
had been previously situated as a predictive factor—including same-sex
marriage.51 Two questions are available on the issue of same-sex marriage in the
dataset—one collecting attitudes regarding a U.S. constitutional amendment asked
of all respondents, and one asking only California respondents about Proposition
8.52 I use the question asked of all the respondents in order to more truly replicate
the intersectionality-as-testable-explanation approach. This question seeks, in a
general context, to target a dependent variable with both strong variation and the
largest possible N:
Now I’m going to read you a list of statements about different policies.
For each statement, please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree,
neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly with
each policy.
....
Q15E. We need an amendment to the U.S. Constitution that would
ban marriages between gays or between lesbians.
The literature on attitudes about same-sex marriage as the primary
contemporary element of a progressive LGBT rights agenda suggests several
factors for which the CMPS has data. Prior literature has suggested that men are
more likely to favor a ban on same-sex marriage than women (sex variable), that
young people are more likely to oppose a ban on same-sex marriage than older
people (age variable), and that African Americans and Latinos resist same-sex
marriage more than Whites and Asians (race variable), as do religious folks
(religiosity/evangelical identity variables).53 From this literature I constructed the
following general model regarding attitudes on the Gay Marriage Ban:

50. Id.
51. 2008 Comparative Multi-Racial Survey Toplines, CMPS STUDY http://www.cmpstudy.com/
uploads/9/0/2/9/9029704/cmps-toplines.pdf (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
52. Id. at 5, 9. Though the CMPS asked only California voters their votes on a statewide
amendment regarding same sex marriage, Arizona and Florida—two other CMPS states—also
featured such initiatives. Thus, the idea of a U.S. constitutional amendment may have been
particularly salient among these voters, although I have not yet tested that possibility.
53. See, e.g., Kenneth Sherrill & Patrick J. Egan, California’s Proposition 8: What Happened and
What Does the Future Hold? (Jan. 2009), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/reports/
pi_prop8_1_6_09.pdf.
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Table 2: General Models of Attitudes Regarding Amendment
of the U.S. Constitution to Ban Gay Marriage54

(Constant)
Ideology

Model 1

Model 2

3.202

2.931

−0.278***
(0.023)

−0.278***
(0.023)

Race/Ethnicity

0.093**
(0.035)

0.191*
(0.113)

Gender

0.203**
(0.080)

0.381*
(0.211)

−0.005**
(0.002)

−0.005**
(0.002)

Evangelical
Identity
Religiosity

0.219***
(0.024)

Race × Gender

0.218***
(0.024)
−0.063
(0.362)

R2

0.156

0.157

N

1660

1660

Although this general model is clearly not desirable for continued study
given its low R2, the general ways in which variables are combined into a linear
regression model is nevertheless illustrative of the traditional intersectionality-astestable-explanation approach to determining whether race, gender, religiosity, and
other factors play a role in predicting support or opposition to a U.S.
constitutional amendment to ban marriages for gays and lesbians.55 According to
most scholars working in this approach to operationalizing intersectionality, the
next step is to then insert an interaction term as an alternate, competing
explanation (as opposed to a race-variable explanation or a gender-variable
explanation) for the variation among respondents.
This model, illustrated as Model 2 in Table 2, selects the two most common
variables used in such interaction terms regarding matters of intersectionality, race,
and gender. Model 2 suggests that Race × Gender is not a statistically significant
explanation of positions on a constitutional amendment banning gay marriage.
54. Standard errors are in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
55. In addition to the model discussed here, the author ran other versions of the model and
found that political party, age in 2008, religious identity, income, education level, and other possibly
relevant variables were not significant and did not substantively change the variation explained in the
models, so they are not reported or discussed here.
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Further, the benefit to the explained variation is barely recognizable. This suggests
that the rule of parsimony should be followed and that with regard to gay marriage
bans, race and gender are autonomous rather than intersectional effects.56
However, many scholars would contend that Crenshaw’s original
formulations of political and structural intersectionality hide diversity within larger
racial and gender groups. Another part of the intersectionality-as-testableexplanation approach, building on this particular claim, usually creates
differentiated models for multiple race-gender groups, to examine whether the
general model explains the variation equally well for all groups.57 I conduct exactly
that analysis in Models 3 through 6 (Table 3), constructing dummy variables for
the race and gender variables as well as interaction terms. All models feature a
dummy variable for gender (1 = male), and each contains a dummy variable for a
specific race group (for example, Model 3 contains a dummy variable for Black,
Model 4 has one for Latino, and so on). Each model reveals that indeed
Crenshaw’s original intuition was correct: the model operates differently for each
race-gender pairing.

56. See S. Laurel Weldon, Intersectionality, in POLITICS, GENDER, AND CONCEPTS: THEORY
& METHODOLOGY 193, 203–04 (Gary Goertz & Amy Mazur eds., 2008) (defining each effect type).
57. See, e.g., Best et al., supra note 7, at 1010, 1015; Pei-te Lien, Does the Gender Gap in Political
Attitudes and Behavior Vary Across Racial Groups?, 51 POL. RES. Q. 869, 877, 879, 881, 883, 884 (1998).
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Table 3: Models of Attitudes Regarding Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
to Ban Gay Marriage Differentiated by Race × Gender58

(Constant)

Model 3
(Black Men)

Model 4
(Latino Men)

Model 5
(Asian American Men)

Model 6
(White Men)

3.968

3.896

3.769

3.908

Ideology

−0.289***
(0.024)

−0.269***
(0.023)

−0.270***
(0.023)

−0.292***
(0.024)

Evangelical
Identity

−0.005**
(0.002)

−0.005**
(0.002)

−0.005**
(0.002)

−0.005**
(0.002)

Religiosity

0.214***
(0.024)

0.223***
(0.024)

0.224***
(0.024)

0.209***
(0.024)

0.418**
(0.150)

0.123
(0.111)

Dummy—Race

−0.125
(0.119)

−0.342**
(0.132)

Dummy—Gender

−0.131
(0.092)

−0.235**
(0.090)

−0.150*
(0.088)

−0.343***
(0.101)

Race × Gender

−0.352*
(0.185)

0.141
(0.199)

−0.397*
(0.216)

0.355**
(0.164)

R2

0.158

0.157

0.157

0.160

N

1660

1660

1660

1660

One look at this table and we notice several factors that continue to stand
out as common to both a general and a race-gender differentiated set of models.
First, Ideology, Religiosity, and Evangelical Identity all stand out as robust and
significant predictors across all of the models regarding prediction of attitudes to a
constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage. However, the differentiated
models by race-gender pairing indicate that the most parsimonious approach—to
focus on ideology, religiosity, and evangelical identity as the most important
factors for every group of men—does not ring true. Indeed, for Black, Asian
American, and White men, the interaction effects are larger than the autonomous
effects of ideology, religiosity, and evangelical identity, though not all have
necessarily higher statistical significance.

58.

Standard errors are in parentheses; *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.
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Based on these four comparative models, Crenshaw’s argument for
intersectionality as an explanation of the world appears to apply not simply to
women of color, but to men as well. That is, there is some diversity within
racial/gender groups as to the explanatory factors for support for a ban on samesex marriage. This set of models, with improved specification and variation
explained of course, could absolutely be heralded as an effective operationalization
of intersectionality at the large-N level, particularly in top academic journals of
political science and sociology.
D. Pragmatic Uses of the Intersectionality-as-Testable-Explanation Approach
Three uses of this kind of operationalization strategy immediately come to
mind. First, this approach could support voir dire strategies for cases like Perry v.
Brown, the case recently granted certiorari by the U.S Supreme Court,59 or Lawrence
v. Texas, the 2003 case that invalidated sodomy laws in thirteen states.60 While
earlier approaches to voir dire have been limited by “pragmatic” judges who apply
Batson v. Kentucky 61 and Georgia v. McCollum 62 to jury selection by preventing little, if
any, “searching” voir dire, the comparative model approach could possibly be
used for exclusion of jurors for cause. While Batson and Georgia focus solely on
race, J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B.63 extends Batson to cover gender. It is not clear
whether it is preferable to extend Batson to sexual orientation; one of the central
issues at stake in Perry is whether sexual orientation should rise to the level of race
as a suspect classification.64 What the intersectionality-as-testable-explanation
approach does is to provide greater nuance regarding the studies of bias in a jury
pool that could provide cause for dismissal of potential jurors.65 It is currently an
open question as to whether intersectional empirical analyses using

59. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v.
Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012).
60. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
61. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96–98 (1986).
62. Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992).
63. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994).
64. Perry, 671 F.3d at 1082.
65. Law professor Abbe Smith has advocated a “vigorous defense” approach that can include
the strategic use of stereotypes, in Abbe Smith, “Nice Work if You Can Get It”: “Ethical” Jury Selection in
Criminal Defense, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 523, 530–31 (1998) [hereinafter Smith, Nice Work]. See also
Abbe Smith, Homophobia in the Halls of Justice: Sexual Orientation Bias and Its Implications Within the Legal
System, 11 AM U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 101, 108–09 (2002–2003); Aaron M. Clemens, Executing
Homosexuality: Removing Anti-Gay Bias from Capital Trials, 6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 71, 95–96 (2005)
(exploring the problem of sexual orientation bias in the court system). But Smith admitted that social
science research on race and gender bias in jury trials was not particularly reliable. Smith, Nice Work,
supra, at 547. In the decades since Smith’s article, such research has become much more reliable,
particularly through widely accepted tests like the Implicit Association Test (IAT). Such tests
acknowledge the susceptibility of self-report data to social desirability bias, and instead
measure subconscious bias. Most of the work in IAT, however, has been of the single category
variety, rather than of intersectional groups.
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intersectionality as a testable explanation could be used to support dismissal for
cause of potential jurors.
Second, and more broadly, this kind of data analysis could support claims for
expanding the set of protected categories meriting strict scrutiny to include sexual
orientation, in that it demonstrates ongoing generalized hostility to basic rights for
LGBT individuals. This data analysis could be part of a larger litigational strategy.
However, in this instance, it is not clear how much value an intersectional analysis
versus a generalized, non-race-gender-specific analysis would provide in making
the case.
Third, and finally, we might consider this kind of data especially relevant for
pursuit of hate or bias crime certification in the criminal context, which offers
certain sentencing enhancements for defendants who are ultimately convicted at
either the state or federal level.66 Although hate crimes at both the state and
federal level represent a small percentage of criminal cases, that small subset of
cases is, nevertheless, a politically salient one—that is, such cases are frequently
covered in the media.67 Here, the racial impact of using this data in such a way
would likely have to contend with the application of such data to criminal
defendants who are, broadly speaking, more likely to be disadvantaged people of
color themselves.68 For CRT scholars, advocating for these kinds of jury selection
rules may run directly counter to CRT’s struggle against a prison industrial
complex that already houses so many of the intersectional groups that have been
identified in this analysis as more likely to support a ban on LGBT individuals’
right to marry.69 The intersectionality-as-testable-explanation approach thus has
immediate, pragmatic uses for lawyers and the clients they represent, but those
uses may cut both ways. It is also easy to understand its broader academic appeal
in the legal academy, given its compatibility with, if not fluency with, standard
empirical legal studies more broadly.70

66. See, e.g., Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2835 (codified as amended in at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3716–3716a, 18 U.S.C. §§ 249,
1389 (2006 & Supp. III 2010)); CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.75 (West 2005).
67. Most recently, a promising elected official running for higher office as an openly gay, Black
male in Mississippi disappeared and was soon found dead. The disappearance and subsequent
discovery of his death made the national news, and pressure immediately mounted for the case to be
certified as a hate crime. Man Charged in Mississippi Mayoral Candidate’s Death, WASH. POST, Mar. 1,
2013, at A2.
68. See Devon W. Carbado, The Construction of O.J. Simpson as a Racial Victim, in BLACK MEN
ON RACE, GENDER, AND SEXUALITY 159, 159–62 (Devin Carbado ed., 1999).
69. See Christopher Chorba, The Danger of Federalizing Hate Crimes: Congressional Misconceptions and
the Unintended Consequences of the Hate Crimes Prevention Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 319, 344–45 (2001).
70. For a comprehensive look at empirical legal studies, see generally THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 901–1001 (Peter Cane & Herbert M. Kritzer eds.,
2010) (discussing the parallels between the intersectionality-as-testable-explanation and standard
empirical legal studies).
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E. Limitations of the Intersectionality-as-Testable-Explanation Approach
The intersectionality-as-testable-explanation approach to empirical intersectionality suffers from two limitations that question the conventional wisdom of
simply applying standard empirical strategies to account for the shift in logic that
intersectionality theory demands.
First, it translates the claims of intersectionality into narrow questions of
identity influence. However, Crenshaw did not contend that intersectional identity
as a social fact causes the limitations and outcomes she discussed. Instead, she
noted that the limitations stem from two intertwined phenomena: legal structures
of power and social movements’ strategies for pursuing remedies, which are not
incorporated into these standard empirical analyses.71 For example, the racinggendering processes described by Crenshaw do not equal Race × Gender effects.72
Net effects analysis requires the assumption that each independent variable (race,
gender, and sexual orientation) competes with the others, holding everything else
equal.
Not only does this assumption not hold in the real world, it is tied to a
further assumption that there is a single causal combination—a single equation’s
solution—that can explain the most variation. Thus, the second limitation is this
approach’s blindness to the reality that most of the policy challenges raised by
intersectionality theory address social problems that are causally complex.73 That
is, there are multiple causal recipes that sets of individuals can pursue to the same
outcome of interest, whether that outcome is dismissal of criminal charges, delay
of deportation proceedings, access to proper HIV/AIDS medical treatment, or
high school graduation. This is an important and relevant consideration. The
intersectionality-as-testable-explanation approach assumes that there is a single
causal combination of factors, which is problematic for a theory that explicitly
articulates wide within-group variation. In other words, the combinations of
processes and disparities faced by Latinas, White females and Asian American
males, may not simply feature quantitatively different roles for race and gender on
the same question, but qualitatively different roles as well.74
This second limitation is particularly important. Net effects analysis is not
well suited to address the three broad domains of intersectionality. According to
Crenshaw, an intersectional analysis provides greater clarity about marginalized
women’s constrained sociopolitical location in these domains.75 The first domain,
structural intersectionality, highlights the contextual factors that produce an inability

71. Crenshaw, supra note 5, at 145–50.
72. Id. at 151.
73. See CHARLES RAGIN, FUZZY-SET SOCIAL SCIENCE 88 (2000) [hereinafter RAGIN, FUZZYSET ]; see also CHARLES RAGIN, REDESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: FUZZY SETS AND BEYOND 9 (2008)
[hereinafter RAGIN, REDESIGNING] (defining “causally complex”).
74. Weldon, supra note 56, at 204–08; see also Lee, supra note 45, at 449.
75. Crenshaw, supra note 9, at 1283.
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to obtain legal remedies that are presumed to be available to legal subjects.76 The
second domain, political intersectionality, highlights the degree to which using a single
group member to serve as a prototype for policy remedies prevents the
comprehensive representation, and by extension, remedy, of the obstacles created
by the drivers of racial, gender, class, and sexuality disparities.77 The third domain,
representational intersectionality, addresses the ways that people who straddle multiple
social locations are culturally constructed.78 When framed as an “analysis” or
“approach,” intersectionality necessitates attention to all three domains in order to
comprehensively explain a causal outcome of interest.
One option we have is to turn away from large-N, quantitative research
entirely, toward smaller-N qualitative research, to test intersectionality’s
explanatory value. Qualitative research in this vein has usually focused on that
general spirit, if not the letter, of Crenshaw’s original articulation. As with the net
effects analysis, qualitative strategies are also prevalent among intersectionality
scholars,79 including those in political science,80 sociology,81 and psychology.82
However, this work shares some of the same challenges as the quantitative
intersectionality-as-testable-explanation approach.
Crenshaw’s overall point in both Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and
83
Sex and Mapping the Margins84 emphasized the degree to which both legal
structures and social movements’ attempt to reform legal structures or change
policy outcomes renders those whose lives are located at the intersection of two or
more axes of marginalization (for example, those who are affected by racial
processes and gender processes) invisible to the institutions and people with the
power to change the rules of the game. Consistent with the inclusionist goals of
Crenshaw’s and Collins’s project to render the invisible visible and commit to

76. Id. at 1245.
77. Id. at 1252.
78. Id. at 1283.
79. As with the IVIT approach, examples abound. See, e.g., EMERGING INTERSECTIONS:
RACE, CLASS AND GENDER IN THEORY, POLICY AND PRACTICE (Bonnie Thornton Dill & Ruth
Enid Zambrana eds., 2009) [hereinafter EMERGING INTERSECTIONS]; JULIA JORDAN-ZACHARY,
BLACK WOMEN, CULTURAL IMAGES, AND SOCIAL POLICY (2008); Elizabeth Cole, Coalitions as a
Model for Intersectionality: From Practice to Theory, 59 SEX ROLES 443 (2008); Elizabeth Cole & Zakiya T.
Luna, Making Coalitions Work: Solidarity Across Difference Within U.S. Feminism, 36 FEMINIST STUD. 71,
74 (2010). As a matter of full disclosure, my early work also fell victim to these kinds of oversights. See
ANGE-MARIE HANCOCK, THE PUBLIC IDENTITY OF THE “WELFARE QUEEN” AND THE POLITICS
OF DISGUST (2004); Ange-Marie Hancock, Contemporary Welfare Reform and the Public Identity of the
“Welfare Queen,” 10 RACE, GENDER & CLASS 31, 40 (2003).
80. HANCOCK, supra note 79; JORDAN-ZACHARY, supra note 79; Hancock, supra note 79.
81. EMERGING INTERSECTIONS, supra note 79.
82. Lisa Bowleg, When Black + Lesbian ≠ Black Lesbian: The Methodological Challenges of Qualitative
and Quantitative Intersectionality Research, 59 SEX ROLES 312 (2008); Cole, supra note 79; Cole & Luna,
supra note 79.
83. Crenshaw, supra note 5.
84. Crenshaw, supra note 9.
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widescale social change on Black women’s behalf, qualitative intersectionality-astestable-explanation research’s intent has mostly been to reveal the invisible
struggles of women of color. Unfortunately, it has been limited by its general lack
of attention to the historical context in which such individuals live, and the focus
on the marginalized aspects of such individuals’ social locations. That is, there is
no concomitant analysis of social locations where there is agency or even
privilege.85 For example, most women of color are straight and possess a
complicated form of heterosexual privilege, an important oversight for which
Fogg Davis took Black feminist theorists to task.86
Moreover, Lisa Bowleg tellingly reveals how her original questions seeking
rank-orderings from her interview subjects about which identity is more
important—their race, their gender, or their sexuality—failed miserably to capture
the answers to the questions she sought.87 In other words, the attempted
disaggregation—dictated by conventional empirical social science—obscured far
more than it revealed. Such research is usually limited to one level of analysis—
either the individual level or the structural level—which ignores Crenshaw’s
assertion that individuals attempt to navigate structural levels of power in a
dynamically interactive manner.
These challenges have multiple ramifications that strongly suggest that a
mere turn to qualitative methods is an incomplete response to the shortcomings
of this testable explanation approach. First, the oversight has led to a
conceptualization of individuals as frozen in time. Prior qualitative
intersectionality research has been criticized for being inattentive to historical
context. Second, the mobilization of multiple categories has been incomplete.
Prior intersectionality research has been criticized for presumptions of some
categories’ relevance (for example, race, class, gender) over others as well as an
incomplete treatment of social locations (focused solely on disadvantage without
concomitant attention to sources of agency or privilege).88
In addition to this critical oversight, the qualitative intersectionality-astestable-explanation approach has two other shortcomings. First, the approach
makes it difficult to develop policy solutions that are scalable beyond an extremely
localized level. Though of course qualitative research is not usually targeted
towards vastly generalizable claims, the relevant question here is whether such
research can be sufficiently attentive to the structural intersectionality domain and
offer a critical eye to the social movements that purport to represent
85. Choo & Ferree, supra note 39, at 136–37.
86. See Cathy J. Cohen, Punks, Bulldaggers and Welfare Queens: The Radical Potential of Queer Politics,
3 GLQ: J. GAY & LESBIAN STUD. 437, 440 (1997), for an earlier description of complex straight
privilege; see also Heath Fogg-Davis, Theorizing Black Lesbianism Within Black Feminism: A Critique of Same
Race Street Harassment, 2 POL. & GENDER 57, 72 (2008).
87. Bowleg, supra note 82, at 322.
88. See Choo & Ferree, supra note 39, at 136–37; Nancy Wadsworth, Intersectionality in
California’s Same Sex Marriage Debates: A Complex Proposition, 64 POL. RES. Q. 200, 203 (2010).
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intersectionally stigmatized populations. One particularly troubling finding
suggests that Crenshaw’s critiques of both extant legal structures and the
responses of identity-driven social movements are still justified. Dara Strolovitch
found evidence of secondary marginalization, even as social movement elites
expressed support for comprehensive representation of their constituencies,
particularly concerns about over-stretching movement organizations’ already overtaxed resources.89 Elsewhere, fears of division of the movement have also
emerged.90 While many qualitative studies echoed this finding, the evidence for a
change in strategy has emerged from experimental evidence and applied analysis.91
A mere turn to qualitative data and methods in this context thus has three central
limitations: (1) it still does not comprehensively attend to all three domains of
intersectionality; (2) it adds an obstacle—the potential for scalability from a policy
perspective is limited; and (3) like net effects, it is almost invariably susceptible to
a lack of attention to historical context and comprehensive plumbing of
categories’ meaning to the lives of the subjects studied.
The above analysis of public opinion concerning bans on same-sex marriage
illuminates the trade-offs involved in conducting a standard net-effects analysis to
empirically operationalize intersectionality. The net effects approach, listed as “the
multiple approach” in Table 1, requires three assumptions that take logical
priors of intersectionality theory and turn them into testable hypotheses:
(a) predetermination of categorical relationships; (b) static conceptions of each
category; and (c) uniformity of cases within each category. All three assumptions
are hallmarks of good positivist net effects scholarship, but they are not
necessarily in line with normative intersectionality theory, which posits nondisaggregability and intersections as a priori assumptions within the theory.
Another empirical approach allows the relaxation of these three assumptions and
is discussed below.
II. THE PARADIGM INTERSECTIONALITY APPROACH
While the implications of the shift from a metaphor of center-margin to a
metaphor of intersecting oppressions has not been as widely interrogated as
89. See CATHY J. COHEN, THE BOUNDARIES OF BLACKNESS: AIDS AND THE BREAKDOWN
BLACK POLITICS 27, 54 (1999) (providing an extant definition of secondary marginalization); see
also DARA STROLOVITCH, AFFIRMATIVE ADVOCACY: RACE, CLASS AND GENDER IN INTEREST
GROUP POLITICS 15–45 (2007) (referencing findings).
90. See ANGELA GLOVER BLACKWELL ET AL., SEARCHING FOR UNCOMMON COMMON
GROUND: NEW DIMENSIONS ON RACE IN AMERICA 146–47 (2002); see also MANUAL PASTOR JR. ET
AL., THIS COULD BE THE START OF SOMETHING BIG 8–10 (2009); Cole & Luna, supra note 79, at 96.
91. For experimental evidence, see Ronnie Michelle Greenwood, Intersectional Political
Consciousness: Appreciation for Intragroup Differences and Solidarity in Diverse Groups, 32 PSYCHOL. WOMEN
Q. 36, 36–47 (2008), and Ronnie Michelle Greenwood & Aidan Christian, What Happens When We
Unpack the Invisible Knapsack? Intersectional Political Consciousness and Intergroup Appraisals, 59 SEX ROLES
404, 404–17 (2008). See Sonia Ospina & Celina Su, Weaving Color Lines: Race, Ethnicity, and the Work of
Leadership in Social Change Organizations, 5 LEADERSHIP 131,141 (2009), for applied evidence.
OF
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needed, I think it is key to understanding the shift in intellectual tradition and logic
that intersectionality represents. Moreover, I think the shift points in a different
empirical direction. My intent is not to dislodge intersectionality from its history,
nor, as Nikol G. Alexander-Floyd warns against, to risk rendering Black women’s
contributions invisible,92 but instead to understand the intersectional turn as
exactly that—a turning point onto a new road. This new road endures thanks to
both technology and the vagaries of traveling theories.
Crenshaw, Adrien Katherine Wing, Mari Matsuda, Trina Grillo, and others in
the legal theory community specifically proposed revisions to a standard
jurisprudential logic of mutually exclusive status categories to a relational logic that
connects structural practices of racism, sexism, classism, and homophobia.93 It is
important to note that Crenshaw did not contend that intersectional identity as a
social fact causes the limitations and outcomes she discussed. That is, the trouble
is not with the intersectional bodies or identities of women of color she placed at
the center of the analysis, rather, the trouble is with the politics that surround such
bodies. As Crenshaw explicitly noted “Although racism and sexism readily intersect
in the lives of real people, they seldom do in feminist and antiracist practices. And
so, when the practices expound identity as woman or person of color as an
either/or proposition, they relegate women of color to a location that resists
telling.”94 Though Crenshaw later modestly said that she did not intend to offer
intersectionality as a “new, totalizing theory of identity,”95 she repeatedly refers to
the intersectionality as “dynamics,”96 an “approach,”97 a “way of framing
interactions,”98 or a “basis for reconceptualizing race.”99 In this regard,
intersectional analysis is proposed in order to answer questions left unanswerable
by prior analytical approaches to race or gender, suggesting a contention that
intersectionality can be thought of in paradigmatic terms by focusing on the
logical shifts intersectionality theorists have made, not simply the empirically
verifiable claims that emerge from such an approach.100
Thinking about intersectionality as a research paradigm proposes approaches
to solving the aforementioned unanswerable questions and establishes standards
by which solutions can be evaluated.101 In accordance with this set of precepts,
92. Alexander-Floyd, supra note 8, at 19.
93. See, e.g., CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM, supra note 33.
94. Crenshaw, supra note 9, at 1242.
95. Id. at 1244.
96. Id. at 1245.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1296.
99. Id. at 1299.
100. Id. at 1245–52.
101. This definition of a paradigm is consistent with the arguments of Thomas Kuhn.
See THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10 (3d ed. 1996). Kuhn is by
no means the final word on research paradigms, but his definition is consistent with the positivist
approaches enacted on some level by most empirical intersectionality scholars.
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paradigm intersectionality in this Article is broadly defined as a justice-oriented
analytical framework for examining persistent sociopolitical problems that emerge
from race, gender, class, sexual orientation and other sociopolitical fissures as
interlocking, process-driven categories of difference.102 When intersectionality is
implemented as a paradigm it has the potential to meaningfully analyze complex
causality—the reality that multiple causal paths can simultaneously lead to the
same outcome.103 In this sense, a paradigmatic approach to empirical
intersectionality can provide a fount of ideas to transform the structures of legal
institutions, including but not limited to judicial oversight, litigation strategies, and
the kinds of remedial relief sought. In a historical moment that features the
persistent retrenchment against civil rights and CRT approaches to structural
change, paradigm intersectionality enables a visioning process more attentive to
the current obstacles faced while remaining true to the theoretical integrity of
intersectionality.
In contrast to Crenshaw’s three domains of intersectionality—structural,
political, and representational—paradigm intersectionality does not locate a
particular domain where intersectional analysis emerges as the superior analytical
lens. Instead, it is intended to provide a comprehensive empirical
operationalization of intersectionality. In other words, paradigm intersectionality
sets empirical standards of research for structural, political, and representational
intersectionality—suggesting how we might empirically investigate the language
barriers facing limited-English speaking immigrant women, how we might examine
evidence of systematic failures of interest group elites to craft a political agenda
that comprehensively represents an entire group’s needs, or how we might
document public identities like the strong Black woman, jezebel, or video vixen as
social constructions that continue to constrain real-life women’s abilities to get just
verdicts in rape cases.
Paradigm intersectionality challenges Occam’s Razor—the idea that the
simplest answer is always the best. Indeed the claims of intersectionality theorists
introduce complexity into empirical research in a number of challenging ways,
particularly methodologically.104 Although incompatible with net effects
approaches, paradigm intersectionality provides useful ways to think about how to
simultaneously incorporate five relevant dimensions of intersectional complexity,
including: complexity within categories (Diversity Within) and between categories
(Categorical Multiplicity, Categorical Intersection); complexity in a given historical

102. Even though I wholeheartedly acknowledge the dynamic processual elements of such
categories as constitutive of their roles in persistent social problems, for reasons of space I refer to
them in a shorthand version as categories of difference throughout this Article.
103. I identify this operationalization of intersectionality at the level of paradigm to distinguish
it from other scholars who conceptualize intersectionality as a concept, method, and/or normative
theory.
104. McCall, supra note 3, at 1772.
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moment as well as over time (Time Dynamics); and complexity in terms of how
categories like race, gender, class, and sexual orientation are shaped by dynamic
processes engaged in by individuals, groups, and institutions (IndividualInstitutional Interactions).
In this Part I outline paradigm intersectionality and its tenets and then turn
to an examination of the same CMPS dataset using fuzzy-set qualitative
comparative analysis (fs(QCA))105 to explore its causal stories regarding support or
opposition to a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage. In so
doing, I illustrate the distinct design and data demands of a paradigm
intersectional approach, noting where relevant its distinctions from the
intersectionality-as-testable-explanation approach to empirical intersectionality.
The brief discussions of each dimension below illustrate the core improvements
asserted above.106
Paradigm intersectionality demands that Categorical Multiplicity be engaged
at a level concomitant to the other dimensions of intersectionality. That is,
scholars are pushed to engage in a formal thought process examining which
categories are worthy of inclusion in the research design according to transparent
standards,107 rather than simply assuming that race-gender are the only relevant
categories for women of color and are somehow irrelevant to other populations—
for example, class, sexual orientation, national status, and religiosity are but a few
additional possibilities that can apply to those on all sides of the power axes within
them. Parsimony remains encouraged without being reified, as deep substantive
and theoretical knowledge of each sociopolitical category allows it to be
conceptualized in the design in interaction with the other four dimensions of
paradigm intersectionality.108
Paradigm intersectionality’s components, Diversity Within, and Categorical
Intersections, facilitate comprehensive attention to what populations share in
common and systematic variation within a sociopolitical category of difference,
contingently conceptualized. For example, if one seeks to understand the racegendering experiences of women of color in Congress, the common processes
affecting all of them are part of Categorical Intersections. Any systematic variation
in such processes, whether attributable to individual orientations (like personality

105. RAGIN, FUZZY-SET, supra note 73, at 322 (explaining that the fuzzy-set approach assesses
the “sufficiency of all possible combinations of causal conditions.”).
106. See HANCOCK, supra note 18, at 33–62, for a comprehensive definition of each dimension
and additional policy case studies.
107. Rita Dhamoon lays out several standards in her work. See RITA KAUR DHAMOON,
IDENTITY/DIFFERENCE POLITICS: HOW DIFFERENCE IS PRODUCED AND WHY IT MATTERS 1–17
(2009); Rita Kaur Dhamoon, Considerations on Mainstreaming Intersectionality, 64 POL. RES. Q. 230, 235
(2011). There has been at least one normative application: the Trayvon Martin murder case. Hancock,
supra note 2.
108. This focus is an important improvement to the IQIR approach to intersectionality work
(design).
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or prior career background) or group orientations (like political party or district
characteristics) are classified as Diversity Within. In other words, attention to
Crenshaw’s notion of political intersectionality is incorporated a priori as a
relevant lens to use in all research questions through Categorical Intersections.
Likewise, Crenshaw’s notion of representational intersectionality can fit into the
Diversity Within element.
This decomposition of intersectional analysis into Categorical Intersections
and Diversity Within builds on the arguments of Laurel Weldon109 and others, but
in a framework that is distinct from net effects. Instead, we reprise Crenshaw’s
formulation of “racism” and “sexism” discussed in the introduction to this Article,
rather than rely on independent race and sex variables.110 The fs(QCA) analysis of
the CMPS data in the next Part will illustrate how to create causal conditions and
causal recipes regarding attitudes regarding same-sex marriage.
This dual-dimension framework can more faithfully account for the roles of
agency and collective action among populations who may choose different
strategies or have different resources available to them for utilization. The final
two dimensions flesh out this conceptualization featuring two distinct processes
and incorporate Crenshaw’s sense that individuals and groups engage in legal
structures within historical contexts. Time Dynamics focuses on the relevance of
sociopolitical development across time and within a particular historical context,
while Individual-Institutional Interactions join with Categorical Intersection and
Diversity Dithin to more fully engage agency and collective action by analyzing
outcomes as products of ongoing, dynamic interactions between and among
individuals, groups, and institutions. In other words, Crenshaw’s notion of
structural intersectionality is incorporated into the analysis through IndividualInstitutional Interactions, again as something to be analyzed in all empirical
intersectionality research projects. Figure 1 outlines the five components of
paradigm intersectionality as a proposed rubric for an empirical intersectionality
research design.

109. Weldon, supra note 56, at 201–03.
110. In the broader project from which this analysis is drawn, I articulate benefits for
qualitative researchers. Consciously attending to both Categorical Intersections and Diversity Within
pushes qualitative intersectionality-as-testable-explanation researchers to more fully engage with their
rich data for potentially generalizable categorical intersections without sacrificing the uniqueness
contained in Diversity Within aspects of their data.
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Figure 1: Schematic Diagram of Paradigm Intersectionality
Dimensions and Their Possible Empirical Relationships
Categorical
Multiplicity

Categorical
Intersection

IndividualInstitutional
Relations

Paradigm
Intersectionality

Time
Dynamics

Diversity
Within

A. Paradigm Intersectionality’s Methodological Companion: fs(QCA)
Prior work on intersectionality as a research paradigm suggests that fs(QCA)
is a complementary methodology for paradigmatic intersectionality research
designs111 based on their shared commitment to fully address complexity.
Fs(QCA) empowers empirical researchers to make four new moves: (1) configure
cases in a way that fully acknowledge the intersecting roles of racism, sexism,
homophobia, and other processes of marginalization; (2) improve the
operationalization of such processes by using case-oriented rather than variableoriented empirical analysis; (3) incorporate the reality that there are multiple paths,
even within race or gender groups, to the same outcome of interest; and, (4) where
applicable, better incorporate the richness of narratives and other interpretive data
into scalable policy proposals for social change.
Fs(QCA) is a technique amenable to paradigm intersectionality research for
several reasons—most of which center upon the level of transparency, reflexivity,
and calibration capacity for many measures that are often used with an alarming
lack of attention to all three standards of research. Values associated with levels of
membership are assigned to each of the causal conditions and outcomes. These
values are based on a standardized and transparent set of cutpoints, which are
created and implemented using substantive and theoretical knowledge of the topic
rather than simple numeric variables at the interval or ordinal levels. Furthermore,
fs(QCA) is capable of analyzing social problems with any number of causal
conditions (k), which produce 2k possible causal combinations that may produce
111.

HANCOCK, supra note 18.
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the outcome of interest. I use the language of causal conditions rather than “causal
factors” and “net effects” because original data is collected and analyzed112 in a
manner different from traditionally conceived single or multiple-measure variables.
Empirical data collection (of any size N) and thorough theoretical and substantive
knowledge shape the process of calibrating and assigning fuzzy values on each
condition to each case—an activity to which we now turn.
Using set theory, we create sets of people who support or oppose the ban on
same-sex marriage via constitutional amendment in a way that is quite different
from a variable oriented approach. To create each causal condition, we assign one
of four possible values between zero and one through synthesis of the entire case.
To reiterate, such assignments are not based on adding up the number of “yes” or
“no” responses to a list of questions to create a continuous variable (as is often
done to create an index variable) but again, through synthesis of the entire case.
Neither is the fuzzy-set equivalent to an ordinal scale.113 Creating this multi-value
fuzzy set provides two intermediate points between the extremes of either fully in
or fully out of the set as opposite ends of the spectrum—(0, 0.25, 0.75, 1).
We generally create two or more sets (fuzzy or crisp) out of each variable
from the CMPS dataset. For example, in calibrating sets that account for the role
of income (or education) in a particular causal condition (say, employment type), it
makes more sense to create a set of high-earning individuals and a set of lowearning individuals, particularly because one of the strengths of fs(QCA) is that it
does not require mutual exclusivity or corrections for what in variable-oriented
logic is called “multicollinearity.” Using our ongoing example of same-sex
marriage, calibrating sets in this manner might allow us to answer a key question
with greater precision—is it having a high income that is linked to opposing a ban
on same-sex marriage, or is it not having a low income that matters?114
From a paradigm intersectionality perspective, assuming that each of these
sets would negate each other is problematic because we want to account
simultaneously for both systematic commonalities (Categorical Intersections) and
variation (Diversity Within) at multiple levels of analysis. It is possible to do so
using fuzzy-set analyses of complex causality because set relations are not framed
in a relative context or assumed to be mutually independent—they are also not
assumed to be symmetric, as bivariate and multivariate correlations demand. That
is, one causal condition isn’t presumed to be in competition with other possible
causal conditions but is instead constructed in relation to the outcome in a
qualitatively distinct manner. This is particularly relevant to the study of social

112. The focus in this Article is on the difference in how the data is analyzed, and the data
used to illustrate both approaches was collected using standard rigorous quantitative survey methods.
113. See RAGIN, REDESIGNING, supra note 73, at 32, 82–84, for a comprehensive explanation
of the difference between index variables and fuzzy sets.
114. See id. at 195, for another example of this logic.
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problems and their solutions because the structural forces related to the outcomes
are accounted for in a complex way in the analysis. As Charles Ragin puts it,
The key issue is not which variable is the strongest (i.e., has the biggest
net effect) but how different conditions combine and whether there is
only one combination or several different combinations of conditions
(causal recipes) capable of generating the same outcome. Once these
combinations are identified, it is possible to specify the contexts that
enable or disable specific causes.115
This understanding of complexity is very similar to assembling evidence for a
particular legal case, where familiarity with the available details permits attorneys
to assemble a particular understanding of how the evidence fits together. Certainly
opposing counsel will have a different understanding of how the evidence fits
together. Fs(QCA) looks at each case and determines which causal recipe from the
universe of possible causal recipes each case fits in, then assigns it to that
particular recipe, as we will see below.
B. An fs(QCA) Analysis of Support for a Ban on Same-Sex Marriage
As even the prior net effects models of different race-gender groups
illustrate, support for or against a ban on same-sex marriage is not necessarily a
simple causality question. This analysis uses the same large-N dataset described
above—the CMPS—along with the same truncated literature review, which was
limited to specific variables (net effects analysis) and causal conditions (fuzzy-set
analysis). The sets are constructed from the responses to CMPS survey questions,
thus using exactly the same data in an entirely different way to provide a focused
comparison on design and method. Based on our same review of the prior
literature on same sex marriage that was used for the net effects analysis, the
following calibrations and set constructions are possible. Again, in order to focus
on the method, I have deliberately limited the number of causal conditions and for
the purpose of this CRT-oriented Article describe in greatest detail the causal
condition of racialism. Table 4 outlines the transformations.

115.

Id. at 114.
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Table 4: Calibration and Constructions of Fuzzy Sets
Causal Condition

CMPS Variables

New Fuzzy or Crisp Sets

Ideological
Orientation

Ideology

Liberal Ideology (fuzzy)
Moderate Liberal Ideology (fuzzy)
Moderate Conservative Ideology (fuzzy)
Conservative Ideology (fuzzy)

Culture of Religiosity

Religiosity
Religious Denomination
Charismatic Church

Religious (fuzzy)
Non-Religious (fuzzy)

Gender Assignment

Sex

Male (crisp)
Female (crisp)

Evangelical
Orientation

Evangelical Identity

Evangelical (crisp)
Non-Evangelical (crisp)

Racialized Subjectivity Race/Ethnicity
Linked Fate
Neighborhood Composition
Income
Education

African American (fuzzy)
Asian American (fuzzy)
Latino (fuzzy)
White (fuzzy)

The CMPS Ideology variable is calibrated into four separate three-value
fuzzy sets: “Liberal,” “Conservative,” “Moderate Liberal,” and “Moderate
Conservative.”116
Religiosity as a variable in the CMPS is likewise converted into multiple
fuzzy sets—“Religious” and “Non-Religious.” Again the distinction here is that
using other variables in combinations that are not simply additive (religious
denomination plus or multiplied by charismatic church attendance) accounts for
varying relationships between church members and their churches. Theoretically
and substantively, the question of same-sex marriage is very much tied to religious
116. While it might be easy to come up with the values for each end of the spectrum (for
example, survey values six and seven, “conservative” and “very conservative,” clearly receive full
membership in the set of conservative ideology respondents, while survey values one and two, “very
liberal” and “liberal,” are fully out of the set and the opposite arrangement for the set of liberal
ideology respondents), it is not absolutely clear that we should rely only on the middle value of four
for crafting a set of moderates. We might also include answers to questions regarding political party
and strength of partisanship, both of which are in the CMPS dataset, to better understand the
moderate set in particular, due to the rise in independent party affiliation over the past decades.
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organizations. Consequently, being able to meaningfully distinguish religious
denominations of CMPS respondents can make all the difference in understanding
the results in two ways. First, two religious denominations—the Catholic and
Mormon churches—are extremely hierarchically organized and have taken
extremely public positions on same-sex marriage through their leadership. Other
Christian denominations have taken comparatively lower profile positions and are
less hierarchically organized in terms of communicating that message. This is
especially true among evangelical, nondenominational churches, which may reach
thousands if they are a megachurch, but again do not have a hierarchical,
geographically dispersed leadership on the scale of the Catholic or Mormon faiths.
Creating the fuzzy sets of “Religious” and “Non-Religious” as higher order
constructs that include attendance at charismatic churches and religious
denomination allow for us to better incorporate the individual-institutional
interactions dimension of paradigm intersectionality. Second, the higher order set
constructions empower us to, in Crenshaw’s terms, explicitly recognize the
intersectional locations of LGBT people of faith, who traditionally keep those
aspects of their lives separate because anti-gay churches are mostly used in that
political intersectionality way—as prototypes for all churches among the
advocates of marriage equality in the LGBT community.117 This again serves the
companion purpose of making the hidden or invisible—LGBT people of faith
and their faith-based allies—visible in the analysis.
Building on Taeku Lee’s work,118 the Racialized Subjectivity causal
condition119 consists of two higher-order constructs120 to account for the role of
race as an identity, a context, a process, and a behavior. I eschew the overreliance
on the question that asks for self-reported race/ethnicity by adding considerations
117. See MIGNON MOORE, INVISIBLE FAMILIES: GAY IDENTITIES, RELATIONSHIPS, AND
MOTHERHOOD AMONG BLACK WOMEN 180–214 (2011), for additional detail about religion and the
Black LGBT community. Another substantive reason why a more robust fuzzy measure is useful is
that, although we can expect Catholics and many conservative Protestant denominations to share
some political attitudes, including one on gay marriage, structurally, Catholic churches and Protestant
churches are set up differently in terms of schedules of offering services. The religiosity variable starts
with “every week” and includes “a few times a month,” but does not include “once a month” as an
option. In other words, Catholics who attend a few times a month get communion, a very important
part of Christian practice, have multiple opportunities to get communion, whereas someone who
attends a church that delivers communion monthly may be just as religious (because he or she shows
up on the important Sundays). Accounting for the different frequencies of communion offering
allows us to more comprehensively operationalize religion as a category of difference in a third way to
account for the individual-institutional interactions dimension of paradigm intersectionality,
expanding our precision where net effects cannot.
118. Lee, supra note 45, at 438–39.
119. I have conceptualized this subjectivity as both a union of individual report measures (like
linked fate and contextual factors like the racial makeup of a neighborhood) and as an intersection of
the same two measures. The analysis that follows uses the former; the latter will be tested at a later
date.
120. See RAGIN, FUZZY-SET, supra note 73, at 321, for a definition of higher order constructs
in fuzzy set theory.
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from CMPS variables that measure respondents’ levels of engagement with their
communities at the individual and structural levels to create combinations of
racialization-based causal conditions. In addition to the more traditional selfreported questions of racial identity and perceptions of linked fate among
members of the same racial group, this racialism condition includes activities that
are under the respondents’ control, such as the sources they sought out for
political information (the CMPS asks the questions in a very useful way about
whether they consume their own ethnic group’s media outlets) and the ethnic
composition of their neighborhoods. While most can choose their own place to
live (within boundaries of course), the services available or the threat experienced
around the issue of same-sex marriage varies in ways that are not fully within
respondents’ grasp, allowing us again to build in structural influences that account
for Individual-Institutional Interactions. In addition to scores on these variables,
the CMPS also collected information about respondents’ personal experiences of
racial and ethnic discrimination, something that is not completely within their
sphere of control that can also become part of this causal condition.121
Although our net effects analysis for the intersectionality-as-testableexplanation approach did not lead us to believe that respondents’ level of
education or income was significantly related to positions on same-sex marriage,
building such factors into this causal condition can add substantive leverage on the
question in connection with neighborhood context (for example, it might be
harder for one to successfully argue that one has been racially discriminated
against in a neighborhood filled with co-ethnics if one is White, but in
communities of color there is quite likely a heightened risk of structural racial
discrimination like police or shop owner harassment; middle and upper class
minorities may also be more familiar with what constitutes discrimination or
harassment). These variables are also brought into consideration for creating each
fuzzy-set of Racialized Subjectivity: African American fuzzy set, Latino fuzzy set,
Asian fuzzy set, White fuzzy set.122
Due to data limitations, “Evangelical Identity” and “Sex” are each
transformed into two crisp sets based on their corresponding CMPS variables. Of
course, this limitation in the variable-oriented dataset can be counteracted in the
121. Admittedly, a more contrarian position could contend that the interpretation of the event
is well within their control, but we are limited by the survey orientation of the data in this regard—no
triangulation or follow up with other sources was possible at the time by design.
122. This method also allows us to account for non-exclusivity among racial cohorts beyond
the neighborhood context question. The net effects assumption of non-exclusivity of these sets in
relation to each other can be fully relaxed in fs(QCA). For example, an African American living in an
Asian American neighborhood is counted in some way in the Asian American set (although not full
or almost full membership barring other Asian-oriented details). The reverse would be true as well.
Why? Because, again, thinking about how Diversity Within, Categorical Intersections, and IndividualInstitutional Interactions are all mutually constitutive dimensions of paradigm intersectionality, the
neighborhood in which one lives plays a significant role in life outcomes. Therefore, to exclude that
person completely from the set would be intellectually dishonest.
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case-oriented context of the legal academy, which could better accommodate the
variation in power, access, and privilege among women and men. Additionally, with
the right data collection efforts, fuzzy gender sets could be constructed to include
transgender people, who are perhaps excluded or possibly improperly assigned in this
version of our dataset, which asked the survey questioner to mark the sex of the
respondent rather than ask the question explicitly.123 That said, I do not want to
underestimate that such a data collection process would be onerous, requiring
review of transcripts of proceedings, in addition to poring over decisions. As well,
variances in gender conformity even when biological sex remains consistent (for
example, a woman who “acts like a man” in corporate settings) could also, in a
case-oriented dataset, be part of this set’s calibration.
The final set calibration concerns the outcome of interest—support for a
constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage.124 Again, because we are not
“counting” in order to create the sets, we are not concerned about giving too
much weight to the responses from people from California in calibrating this set,
because we are making within-case comparisons. Thus, we could include the
answer to the variable question we used in the net effects model, which inquired
about strong agreement or disagreement with a constitutional amendment-level
ban. We could use the answers on California’s Proposition 8 as part of how we
create this set—ranking those who voted “Yes” as closer to full membership
because they have not simply expressed the opinion of agreement but also took
the step of voting their beliefs. Between the two questions, we can think of several
ways in which there could be different levels of set membership: a respondent
could be consistent in his or her attitude and action, or a respondent could be
inconsistent in his or her answer, meaning perhaps they voted in a way inconsistent
with their expressed attitude.
There are other elements of the dataset that could prove relevant,125 but
again for simplicity’s sake, and to provide a direct comparison to the net effects
models above, I focus the calibration for this Article on these causal conditions. It
bears repeating that this fuzzy-set calibration is interpretive, and therefore not the
standard net effects construction of index variables. It is interpretive because it
gives more meaning to the categorical variables, like religious denomination

123. If we were using different datasets or combining the CMPS with in-depth interviews from
archives like the ONE archive at USC, the Center for the American Women in Politics at Rutgers, or
the Global Feminisms Project at the University of Michigan, we might have a broader way of
calibrating these sets regarding gender in particular. However, for this Article, I’m focusing on the
CMPS dataset’s amenability to fs(QCA).
124. We could just as easily have chosen opposition to same-sex marriage as the outcome of
interest. For political organizing purposes on the marriage equality side, we may also have chosen to
create an entirely different set, those who are open to persuasion for marriage equality.
125. One particular option might include exploring consistency across social issues, like
abortion, for which the CMPS has an identically constructed question. Other datasets might include
marital status or other features that could be used to calibrate this set.
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generally, and interpretive in a paradigm intersectionality context because the
interpretations pursued adhere to the interrelationships between four of the five
dimensions possible in the data (Categorical Multiplicity, Categorical Intersections,
Diversity Within, and Individual-Institutional Interactions).126
C. Fuzzy-Set Analysis and Discussion
Boolean truth tables are the key analytic tool for identifying combinations of
causal conditions that produce the outcome of interest—the set of voters who
favor a ban on same-sex marriage. Two key measures, consistency and coverage,
provide standards for assessing whether these causal recipes are worthy of
attention in a manner akin to—but qualitatively different from—statistical
significance (consistency) and the empirical relevance of the hypothesized settheoretic connection in a manner akin to—but qualitatively different from—
coefficient strength (coverage).127 The truth table permits us to identify for which
causal recipes there is strong empirical evidence and to measure the consistency of
that evidence. The solution to the truth table provides measures of coverage and
consistency for each recipe and the overall solution (model) as a whole.
With three causal conditions, there are 25, or thirty-two possible
combinations. The truth table displays all thirty-two possible combinations of the
variables, but not all are represented empirically in the CMPS data. Table 5 thus
shows a mid-stage truth table that emerged from the consideration of the set of
CMPS pro-ban respondents, with the four causal combinations that accounted for
100% of the cases that are members of the set of pro-ban respondents. It is
analyzed below.
Table 5: Truth Table of Causal Outcome of Interest—
Set of Pro-Marriage Ban Voters128

RS

R

C

G

EI

No. of
Cases

ProBan

Raw
Consistency

PRI
Consistency

Product

1

1

1

1

1

636

1

0.645155

0.565648

0.364931

1

0

1

1

1

193

1

0.557837

0.355373

0.19824

1

1

0

1

1

178

0

0.531087

0.349592

0.185664

1

0

0

1

1

115

0

0.45889

0.174853

0.080239

126. Time Dynamics as a dimension is omitted for the purposes of this Article because we
only have data at one point in time.
127. See RAGIN, REDESIGNING, supra note 73, at 44–45, for a more comprehensive
explanation of the similarities and differences between the two sets of standards.
128. Abbreviations: RaceSub1 (RS), Religious (R), Conservative (C), Gender (G), Evangelical
Identity (EI).
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Table 5 lists four possible causal combinations that can be submitted to
create a standard solution to the truth table. The consistency figures express the
degree to which membership in that corner of the vector space is a consistent
subset of membership in the outcome. Like significance, consistency “signals
whether an empirical connection merits the attention of the investigator.”129
Coverage assesses the empirical relevance of the necessary condition at issue, in a
manner akin to strength in net effects analysis.130 The truth table permits us to
assess raw consistency first, using a low threshold of fifty percent in order to
proceed with the analysis. Two causal recipes meet that threshold:
1. Racial Subjectivity* Religious* Gender* Conservative Ideology*
Evangelical Identity,
2. Racial Subjectivity* Gender* Conservative Ideology* Evangelical
Identity.
Table 6: Solution Table for Pro Marriage Ban Truth Table

Raw Coverage Unique Coverage Consistency
Complex

RaceSub*Conservative

0.779356

0.779356

0.581296

0.779356

0.779356

0.581296

Conservative Ideology

0.779356

0.779356

0.581296

Solution Coverage

0.779356

Solution Consistency

0.581296

Ideology
Intermediate

Evangelical Identity*
Gender*Conservative
Ideology*RaceSub

Parsimonious

Table 6 provides the standard solution to the truth table analysis, where
these two causal recipes are flagged (marked with a “1” on pro-ban in Table 5). Of
the thirty-two causal combinations that were logically possible, two combinations
were identified in the solution. Surprisingly, the solution offers three possible
causal recipes, all of which feature the same solution coverage and consistency.

129.
130.

RAGIN, REDESIGNING, supra note 73, at 45.
Fuzzy-set analysis is likewise amenable to probability testing and other statistical methods.
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There are a number of reasons for this outcome,131 but the key point for the
purposes of this Article is that the solutions going forward, from a policy
perspective, may all explain the relevant causal conditions leading to inclusion in
the set of people who are pro-marriage ban by U.S. constitutional amendment.
Comparison of Table 5 and Tables 2 and 3 highlight the conceptual distinction
between net effects analyses. Each of the models in Table 2 and 3 is considered
the best sole causal path that fits the data. On the other hand, Table 5 permits
three distinct causal recipes to describe the same data, with identical consistency
and coverage. In this way, the notion that the arrival at support for a ban on samesex marriage may not proceed for all survey respondents identically—that samesex marriage is a causally complex subject—is accounted for in the fuzzy-set
methodology.
It is this causal complexity approach—a multiple causal path solution—that
has the most purchase for the kinds of questions examined by CRT and
intersectionality scholars alike. Moreover, this approach to analyzing complex
social problems where racialism plays a persistent role can facilitate the
implementation of legal theories like john a. powell’s “targeted universalism,”132
allowing judges and juries to develop targeted remedies, particularly in class action
cases. In contrast to a search for the single strongest variable’s net effect, the
analysis here would suggest three empirically documented causal recipes that
produce the outcome—respondents being included in the set of pro-ban
supporters. The analysis here highlights both the suitability of fs(QCA) to
paradigm intersectionality as an analytical framework and paradigm
intersectionality’s applicability to a challenging social justice problem of our time,
one that is coded with racial, gender, class, and sexuality norms heading in
multiple directions.133 Fuzzy-set qualitative analysis thus not only presents the
opportunity to include additional detail in classifying each respondent, but is also
quite amenable to higher-level quantitative analyses without the trade-offs
associated with net effects analyses like bivariate and multiple regression, making it
more useful for policy-related data analysis from a paradigm intersectionality
perspective.
III. CONCLUSIONS: A TALE OF TWO APPROACHES
The intersectionality-as-testable-explanation approach, though currently
dominant in empirical intersectionality research, is by no means the only approach
to empirically operationalizing intersectionality. Its pragmatic utility to current

131. The standard threshold for inclusion is 0.75, but these recipes were significantly lower
(0.65, 0.56). As well, the model again may not yet have all of the relevant causal conditions—for
simplicity’s sake and space purposes, the logic of the method was privileged here.
132. john a. powell, Post-Racialism or Targeted Universalism?, 86 DENV. U.L. REV. 785, 803–06
(2009).
133. HANCOCK, supra note 18, at 63.
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legal practice is clear, as its results are already part of standard legal evidentiary
guidelines in most U.S. courts. However, this approach, thanks to its consistency
with widely practiced empirical methods of legal scholarship, incompletely
operationalizes intersectionality, which thus limits its ability to fully challenge the
legal structures that critical race and intersectionality theorists incisively critique.134
Thus, its strength—its potential for immediate mobilization in the current legal
system—is also its devastating limitation. For these reasons, I would contend that
there are strong institutional incentives for legal scholars to conceptualize
intersectionality in this way.
Yet, even in this incentive structure, there are equally strong norms of
accurate theory translation. Intersectionality as a testable explanation has, as I have
demonstrated, several significant inconsistencies with the basic tenets of CRT and
intersectionality. These include, but are not limited to, a disaggregation strategy in
net effects analysis and a simplistic, overly reductive orientation to how race,
gender, sexuality, and class operate at the micro-level. If the goal is strong
empirical operationalization of what intersectionality suggests about the role of
narrative, the role of structures and invisibility, and the fusion, rather than the
dissolution, of a race-gender-sexual-class sociopolitical location, this strategy
misses the mark. For this reason, it is unlikely to produce the structural impact
sought by intersectionality scholars. However, that structural impact is as much a
political effort as a legal one, and perhaps other empirical strategies are better
suited for that task. Would intersectionality-as-a-testable explanation have as much
reach as it does if it were named, as in Table 1, a “multiple approach” rather than
an “intersectional approach,” given the buzz surrounding intersectionality
scholarship of late? Perhaps not.
In contrast to intersectionality as a testable explanation, paradigm
intersectionality is far more consistent with the tenets of intersectionality theory,
both as originally outlined by Crenshaw and Collins and in the years since by other
normative theorists. It opens up methodological choices beyond standard net
effects analysis and, when paired with fs(QCA), offers an equally rigorous method
of large-N or small-N data analysis to answer research questions. Moreover, using
fs(QCA) enables more comprehensive usage of narrative data in their entirety and
all of their complexity, given its grounds in qualitative research.
That said, paradigm intersectionality, because it uses an unfamiliar method
and is more associated with deconstruction and critique, is not as easily integrated
into current legal praxis. Evidentiary standards could require changes before
formal inclusion of the approach as a standard approach to empirical legal
scholarship, particularly its strong connection to history (Time Dynamics) and
structural critique, instead of exclusive focus on the individual claimant. For this
reason, paradigm intersectionality requires greater vetting and honing at the same
134.

See sources cited supra notes 71–91.
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time that efforts must be made on multiple fronts to transform the legal system at
the structural level.
Given the current political landscape of polarization and retrenchment,
it may not be possible to reject either method. To reject intersectionality as a
testable explanation would “cede ground,” in the language of Neil Gotanda,135
that CRT scholars cannot reasonably afford to lose—claimants are seeking relief
and must use all available and permissible strategies to remedy the injustices that
continue to pervade our society. On the other hand to ignore paradigm
intersectionality would risk losing some of the most valuable structural insights of
legal scholarship in a generation. Moreover, it is critical to avoid playing small
ball—that is, we should eschew constantly struggling to manufacture victories by
exclusively defensive play at the expense of building a strong and visionary
offense. To do otherwise will limit our future ability to transform the society we
sought to change by becoming change-oriented scholars in the first place.

135. Comments made in response to an earlier version of this Article at the UC Irvine Law
School’s “Critical Race Theory and Empirical Methods” symposium, April 2012.

